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Abstract
Objective: To assess the scientific and ethical basis for clinical innovation in psychopharmacology.
Methods:  We conducted a literature review, utilizing MEDLINE search and bibliographic cross-referencing, and
historical evidence regarding the discovery and development of new medications in psychiatry. Clinical innovation was
defined as use of treatments in a clinical setting which have not been well-proven in a research setting.
Results: Empirical data regarding the impact of clinical innovation in psychopharmacology are lacking. A conceptual and
historical assessment of this topic highlights the ethical and scientific importance of clinical innovation. Ethically, it touches
a borderline that, in our judgment, is not adequately framed in contemporary mainstream bioethics. Currently, research
is viewed as not at all benefiting the patients who participate in it, while clinical care is viewed as being solely for the
benefit of patients. Clinical innovation straddles these two worlds, uncomfortably at times. While many argue that clinical
innovation should either be avoided or folded into research projects, we argue that clinical innovation is necessary for
progress in psychopharmacology research, and that it can prosper best when guided by the following ethical principles:
1.) The treatment should be based on a viable hypothesis. 2.) Whenever possible, one's clinical observations should be
reported so they can be evaluated by the scientific community. 3.) One should be willing to report unexpected
observations of drug effects. 4.) A high standard of informed consent should be maintained. Again, this proposal goes
against the standard view among bioethicists that research and clinical care are categorically opposed activities, as made
clear by the either-or dichotomy of the Belmont Report on bioethics. This approach has so polarized our profession into
clinicians versus researchers, that many clinicians will not apply new knowledge produced by clinical research until it
eventually gets incorporated into formal treatment guidelines, while researchers have little to guide them as to what kind
of new knowledge it is most important to provide.
Summary: Clinical innovation brings out the ambiguities in our current ethical conceptions of research versus clinical
care. Yet, historically, clinical innovation has been an important contributor to progress in psychopharmacology. We
argue that clinical innovation should not be discouraged, but rather it should occur under certain ethical conditions.
"Almost everyone can and should do research...because almost everyone has a unique observational opportunity at some
time in his life which he has an obligation to record....If one considers the fundamental operations or methods of research,
one immediately realizes that most people do research at some time or another, except that they do not call their activity
by that name. There are seven operations....In simple language they are counting, sorting, measuring, comparing, nature-
study, guess testing, and reappraisal....Guess testing is of course what most people think of when the word research is
mentioned; except that it is bad manners to call a guess a guess. It should be called an hypothesis. Let us make one plea.
Guessing becomes merely a game unless it is done in the context of a plan for action. It is a waste of time elaborating
untestable hypotheses [1]."
John Cade
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Introduction
Most clinicians, researchers, and ethicists would agree that
it is important to expand medical knowledge, and thus, at
a very basic level, it is ethical to engage in research, given
appropriate protections for research subjects. As a corol-
lary, one might argue that it is unethical not to do
research, and indeed advancing knowledge through
research is recognized as one of the ethical principles of
the American Psychiatric Association [2]. In other words,
if no one engaged in research, and no one tried to expand
the bounds of knowledge, that too would be an unethical
state of affairs. We must, as a result, constantly be aware of
the need to balance the risk of being ignorant versus the
risks involved in obtaining new knowledge. Too often,
this debate is one-sided, focused on the risks involved in
obtaining new knowledge. But there are risks on both
sides of the ledger, and not doing research poses real risks
also. Hence the importance of assessing the merits of clin-
ical innovation, which we believe is a legitimate compo-
nent of the research process, as explained below.
We define clinical innovation as use of treatments in a
clinical setting which have not been well-proven in a
research setting.
Clinical innovation occurs, by definition, outside of for-
mal research protocols. There is a risk that guidelines of
any kind, however well-intentioned, will impede clinical
innovation unnecessarily. On the other hand, there are
limits to acceptable innovation, and in some cases, one
can imagine cases of innovation that would appear to be
unethical.
Part of the problem is that the bioethics community has
sought to cleanly and completely separate clinical practice
from research. In the Belmont Report of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects,[3] for
instance, an attempt was made to separate "practice",
where "interventions are designed solely to enhance the
wellbeing of an individual patient or client and that have
a reasonable expectation of success", from "research",
defined as "an activity designed to test an hypothesis, per-
mit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge." In fact, the clini-
cian/researcher engaging in clinical innovation is not act-
ing with solely one set of interests in mind, but two. On
the one hand, the clinician/researcher wants to help the
individual patient; on the other hand, the clinician/
researchers wants to gain some experience or knowledge
from his observation. Some in the bioethics community
set up this scenario as a necessary conflict. They seem to
think that a choice must be made: either the clinician
must choose to seek only to make the patient better, with-
out learning anything in the process, or the clinician must
seek to learn something, without any intention at all to
improve the patient's lot. As with so much in life, there are
in fact multiple interests here and there is no need to insist
that those interests do not overlap at all. First and fore-
most in any clinical encounter is the clinician's responsi-
bility to the individual welfare of the patient. Any
innovative treatment, observation, or hypothesis cannot
be allowed to lead to complete lack of regard for the
patient's welfare. Unfortunately, the Belmont Report and
much of the mainstream bioethics literature presumes
complete and unavoidable conflict of these interests:
"When a clinician departs in a significant way from stand-
ard or accepted practice, the innovation does not, in and
of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure is
"experimental", in the sense of new, untested, or different,
does not automatically place it in the category of
research.... [but] the general rule is that if there is any ele-
ment of research in an activity, that activity should
undergo review for the protection of human subjects." It
may be worthwhile to point out the dominant role of the
legal profession in bioethics and its orientation towards
the adversary process (winner vs. loser, guilty vs. inno-
cent) which is predicated on artificial dichotomies in
which confluence of interest becomes conflict of interest.
Indeed, many bioethicists lack personal experience either
in clinical medicine or in clinical research. An analogy
would be if lawyers ceded legal ethics to philosophers
with no experience in the practice of the law.
This approach leads, in our opinion, to uncontrolled clini-
cal innovation and overregulated formal research. We will
return to the Belmont Report later, but now we will turn
to what we think is the key to realizing the importance
and legitimacy of clinical innovation outside of formal
research protocols. We think the ultimate rationale for
clinical innovation is evidence from the history of psy-
chopharmacology that such innovation is essential to the
discovery of new knowledge. Further, since such innova-
tion, by definition, occurs outside of formal research pro-
tocols, if we grant it legitimacy, then we will need to think
about how we can provide an ethical framework to sup-
port it.
While we focus here on psychopharmacology, the same
issues apply to medicine in general (consider for example
how new surgical techniques evolve), and the same prob-
lems exist in the understanding of research ethics in med-
icine. Since research with psychiatric medications in
particular is often subject to criticism, we believe there is
a special a need to clarify this matter in psychiatry.
The history of psychopharmacology
Every new class of agents in psychopharmacology has
begun with clinical innovation or novel observations [4].
This has been the case with iproniazid, which was
observed, in clinical settings, to have mood elevatingPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:26 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/26
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properties in tuberculosis patients, and reserpine, which
was observed to be associated with depression; these find-
ings led to the development of monoamine oxidase inhib-
itors for the treatment of depression. Phenothiazines were
used as anesthesia and a clinician observed that they had
major tranquilizing effects, so they were subsequently
tried as a treatment for psychosis and found to work [5].
When tricyclic antidepressants were being developed as
potential treatments for schizophrenia (since they are
chemical derivatives of phenothiazines), they were
observed by an alert clinician to improve depressive
symptoms in patients with schizophrenia [6]. Lithium
was discovered by John Cade, who used it in a small group
of selected manic patients (see below) [7]. And car-
bamazepine was initially extended to bipolar disorder
based on innovative observation of evidence of benefit for
mood in epilepsy [8]. In every case, when there has been
a fundamental new departure in psychopharmacology, it
always began with clinical innovation. It never began in a
research protocol with well-thought out methodologies,
hypotheses, outcome measures, and guidelines for ethical
conduct.
This history is not unique to psychopharmacology. Anti-
biotics famously began in the serendipitous work of Alex-
ander Fleming. Antihypertensives also were discovered
based on unexpected observations. Clinical innovation is
the fount of research discoveries for all of medicine, and
psychiatry is no different.
Since advancing knowledge is recognized as an ethically
justified and important activity, and clinical innovation
precedes and is the source of major advances in formal
clinical research (as noted above), then clinical innova-
tion too is not only ethically justifiable, but is, indeed,
ethically required.
If we accept that clinical innovation is ethically legitimate,
then the question becomes, as with all research, what are
the ethical guidelines within which clinical innovation
can best be conducted, focusing on the proper assessment
of the risk benefit ratio of research.
In other words, what is the ethical basis of clinical innova-
tion? Perhaps two case scenarios will help clarify the sub-
ject.
Case scenarios
Dr. X primarily treats mood disorders and is interested in
new drugs because many of his patients have failed treat-
ment with "standard" medications. Many new medica-
tions become available to practitioners after being
approved by the FDA for disorders other than depression
(e.g., epilepsy). Dr. X begins to give these medications to
some of his patients with mood disorders, and soon most
of his patients are taking various combinations of them.
Dr. X never publishes his experience, which is unfortunate
because initially studies of those medications for mood
disorders are sparse. Those studies which do appear are
quite preliminary of necessity (uncontrolled, nonrand-
omized, small case series). When asked, Dr. X strongly
asserts his beliefs regarding the benefits of certain medica-
tions he uses and the lack of utility of others.
Here is another scenario. Dr. Y also likes to use new drugs,
similarly for mood disorders although the medications
are FDA indicated only for other conditions. After using
these agents in 5–10 patients, she usually publishes her
experience. Sometimes, she then becomes involved in
obtaining funding for more rigorous studies of those
medications which appear potentially useful based on her
publications. In some cases, her early experience is con-
firmed by randomized studies (and occasionally new FDA
indications), and sometimes they are not confirmed.
Neither Dr. X nor Dr. Y prepare a protocol or obtain IRB
approval or a research-based informed consent for their
clinical use of any of these medications.
Are these doctors practicing ethically?
Before we can answer this question, let's consult the his-
tory of psychopharmacology in search of a model for
effective innovation.
Innovation in psychopharmacology: lithium as a model
In the 1940s, John Cade hypothesized that mania and
depression represented abnormalities of nitrogen metab-
olism [7]. He injected urine samples from psychiatric
patients into guinea pigs, all of whom died. He concluded
that the nitrogenous product, urea, was probably acting as
a poison, and later tested uric acid solubilized as lithium
urate, which led to marked calming of the pigs, without
sedating them. Further tests identified lithium to be the
calming agent, and Cade then proceeded, on the principle
of primum non nocere, to try lithium himself before giv-
ing it to patients. His first patient improved markedly, but
then experienced toxicity and died after a year. Despite
improvement in other patients, Cade was quite concerned
and abandoned using lithium further due to its toxicity,
but reported his findings in detail. Other researchers, in
the first randomized clinical trials in psychiatry, proved
lithium safe and effective at nontoxic level.
Would we have lithium if Cade were working today? We
think it is unlikely. If Cade worked in a hospital today, he
likely would not have been able to obtain enough animal
data to justify using lithium in humans. Hence, Cade's
case highlights the opportunity costs of ethical restrictionsPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:26 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/26
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on clinical innovation. The risks of not discovering drugs
should not be ignored.
Cade's philosophy of research
As noted in the introductory quote to this paper, drawn
from a presidential address given to the Australian and
New Zealand College of Psychiatry near the end of his life,
Cade identified "guess testing", comparable to what we
are calling innovation in this paper, as essential to psy-
chopharmacological research. And the most essential
aspect of innovation, according to Cade, is that there
should be hypothesis testing. In other words, innovative
use of medications should not be random; it should be
driven by legitimate hypotheses, and therefore provable
or disprovable. This will turn out to be important, as dis-
cussed below. The role of serendipity, driven by hypothe-
sis testing, has also been emphasized by many [4]. Indeed,
Pasteur's famous maxim about chance favoring the pre-
pared mind can be interpreted as involving the combina-
tion of serendipity and hypothesis testing. If one has
hypotheses, and one is actively seeking to test them, then
one is more likely to come across "chance" findings that
others may either not observe or not experience. The pres-
ence of hypotheses is not indiscriminate however. Some
kind of sound rationale, be it pharmacological or theoret-
ical is needed, to support clinical innovation.
It is also important to emphasize, nonetheless, that
chance findings can also be noticed by an alert physician
even if no prior hypothesis exists. For instance, no
hypothesis of antidepressant effect preceded the observa-
tion that use of reserpine led to depression, or that imi-
pramine used in schizophrenia improved depressive
symptoms. These two innovative observations, neither
initially driven by hypotheses, set the ball in motion that
ultimately led to a Nobel Prize given to Julius Axelrod and
his colleagues for their working on unraveling the bio-
chemical mechanisms of these agents. All this work
started with clinical observation without hypothesis.
Much clinical innovation begins with the use of a drug for
an indication not used before, which then leads to novel
observations that lead to a new hypothesis that can then
be tested.
Thus, while one major path of clinical innovation is the
path described by Cade, where one possesses an hypothe-
sis, and one is experimentally interested in testing the
hypothesis, and new findings occur as a result. In the
other path of clinical innovation, alert clinicians watch for
unexpected effects when using a drug for legitimate pur-
poses. Without possessing an initial hypothesis, these cli-
nicians find something they didn't expect. This truly
serendipitous finding leads to hypotheses which can then
lead to further clinical innovation and eventually more
organized research.
Innovation and clinical trials
Most interested parties do not knowingly and overtly
oppose innovation per se. Yet, if we assert that certain
guidelines should encompass all innovation, we are in
fact are taking a position against innovation, and not pay-
ing attention to the risks involved in not allowing suffi-
cient innovation. If we insist that all clinical innovation
should be regulated in some manner, then we are taking a
purist position that focuses only on the risks of research,
but not the risks of not doing research.
It is also striking that there is a double standard here:
attempts to expand knowledge that are labeled "research"
receive intense scrutiny, whereas clinical innovation
receives no scrutiny at all. Yet the dividing line between
"research" and clinical innovation is not clear-cut, and we
believe that the best clinical work is also research in the
sense of clinical innovation, and the best organized
research grows out of clinical innovation [4].
It is vital to acknowledge that virtually everything that gets
to clinical trials comes from early clinical innovation.
Conceived in terms used by Evidence-based Medicine
(EBM),[9] innovation in psychopharmacology more com-
monly proceeds bottom-up, rather than top-down (Table
1). Innovation proceeds usually from level V case reports,
through levels III-IV naturalistic and nonrandomized
studies, to levels I-II randomized studies.
Frequently, clinical practice even outpaces or even corrects
mistakes from randomized studies. For instance, in the
classic case of SRI-induced sexual dysfunction, the early
randomized clinical trials that led to FDA indications for
those agents reported low rates of sexual dysfunction.
However, clinical practice demonstrated much higher
rates. In this case, the "less rigorous" evidence of clinical
practice was more accurate than the "more rigorous" evi-
dence of randomized clinical trials. This is often the case
with side effects. For sexual dysfunction, a number of fac-
tors were involved: This side effect is the kind that needs
to be actively assessed; passive patient self-report underes-
timates it. Since the clinical trials did not actively seek to
identify sexual dysfunction, they did not detect it. Further,
many side effects occur to a higher degree in patients with
medical illnesses, or comorbid conditions like substance
abuse, or in the young or the elderly, and these types of
persons are generally excluded from clinical trials. Thus,
the pure homogeneous clinical trial sample, which is
highly selected to maximize drug efficacy, is not general-
izable enough to the real world population in terms of
side effects.
Hence clinical practice, and research conducted in the
uncontrolled clinical setting, is highly generalizable andPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:26 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/26
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often produces more accurate data on certain issues, such
as side effects, than do clinical trials.
What is ethical innovation in psychopharmacology?
Conventional wisdom holds that ethical research 1) is sci-
entifically sound; 2) involves informed consent; and 3) is
not characterized by unacceptable risk. These standards
are supposed to met through the institutional review
board (IRB) process.
In the setting of clinical innovation, where the IRB process
is not invoked, it appears to us that these three impera-
tives of ethical research can be met in an alternative man-
ner. To be scientifically sound, ideally, innovation must
be hypothesis-driven, as strongly urged by Cade. Further,
a greater degree of informed consent should be docu-
mented in clinical notes by the innovating clinician, as
compared to the use of standard proven agents. Also, the
issue of risk needs to be carefully weighed and docu-
mented by the practicing clinician. This last issue is no dif-
ferent than the same clinical judgment exercised on a
daily basis by psychiatrists with proven but risky treat-
ments (e.g., clozapine for schizophrenia). This is not a
medico-legal issue primarily, but reflects the need for
more clearly educating patients about the rationale  for
what is being proposed than is often the case with non-
innovative treatments. Further, the patient needs to accept
the rationale, as opposed to going along with the better
known risks and benefits of already proven treatments. All
of these options must be explicitly discussed with
patients. What must be avoided at all costs is a doctor with
a new idea who simply imposes it on his patients without
the above safeguards.
In some cases, clinical innovation can be ethical in the
absence of an hypothesis also. This is frequently the case
with extremely refractory patients. In such cases, a new
treatment may be tried with no hypothesis other than a
test to see if it works. We assume that the usual clinical
safeguards are in place, with attention paid to risks and
patient consent as described above. Of course this ration-
ale does not cover indiscriminate or even silly practice,
such as the use of an antibiotic for treatment refractory
depression. As mentioned previously, some kind of sound
rationale, biological or conceptual, is required to support
innovative practice as well as to avoid indiscriminate
activities. In this setting, all clinicians have an obligation
to report unexpected novel observations, which, when at
their most novel, are not hypothesis-based.
The unique risk in innovative psychopharmacology is that
risks and benefits are little understood; this differs form
proven but risky treatments like clozapine. In this setting,
one needs to have a mindset that is cautious though not
closed-minded.
The cases
Let's illustrate these issues with our two scenarios. Dr X
used all kinds of medications without attempting to
organize, quantify, or publish his experience. Further-
more, he holds strong beliefs about the benefits and risks
of medications based almost solely on his clinical experi-
ence. Dr. Y used the same medications, but reported her
experience to the scientific community, and was involved
in research protocols based on her pilot uncontrolled
experience. What did Cade do? Cade used lithium with a
research hypothesis in mind. He further tried it on ani-
mals before humans given the absence of any prior
human use. He even tried it on himself before using it
with other patients. He reported his experience immedi-
ately to the scientific community. One of his first patients
in fact became toxic on lithium and died. Cade reported
this death and curtailed his use of the medication. Other
researchers were able to conduct rigorous research proto-
cols based on Cade's early reports. Cade and Dr. Y have
much in common, which we think helps us identify the
ideal characteristics of ethical innovation.
Based on the above historical and conceptual considera-
tions, ethical innovation, we submit, has the following
Table 1: Innovation in psychopharmacology proceeds bottom-up more frequently than top-down in the levels of evidence
Level I: Double-blind randomized trials Ia: Placebo-controlled
Ib: Non placebo-controlled
Level II: Open randomized trials
Level III: Naturalistic studies IIIa: Nonrandomized, controlled studies
IIIb: Large nonrandomized, uncontrolled studies (n > 100)
IIIc: Medium-sized nonrandomized, uncontrolled studies (100 > n > 50)
Level IV: Small naturalistic studies (nonrandomized, uncontrolled, (50 > n > 10)
Level V: Case series (n < 10), Case report (n = 1), Expert opinion
Adapted by us from principles of Evidence-based Medicine [9]
In terms of the timeline of how the discovery process proceeds, this schema is inverted. Everything begins at level V with novel observations and 
clinical innovation, and proceeds upwards. Putting emphasis on the utility of controlled studies should not lead to the conclusion that research 
simply consists of doing controlled studies.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:26 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/26
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ideal characteristics (Table 2). It involves the use of a new
treatment based on a viable research hypothesis in an
uncontrolled setting. The purpose of the innovator is not
only to try to help his individual patient, but, at the very
least, also to report his experience to the larger scientific
community. Further, the innovator may himself be
involved in advancing knowledge of that treatment
beyond early uncontrolled clinical experience to more rig-
orous knowledge through research protocols (which then
entail the usual protections of informed consent and IRB
procedures).
Nonetheless, Dr. X is not necessarily unethical either. This
is because the other pathway to innovation, though not
ideal, is important. The second pathway involves pure
chance observations in which unexpected findings occur
without a priori hypotheses. Nor is it necessarily unethical
to refrain from publishing one's experience; we simply
mean to suggest that it is better to put one's experience in
the public domain, preferably through publishing, so as
to be open and transparent about one's activities, and also
so as to spur others to re-examine and advance those
observations.
The absence of an empirical literature
We were unable to locate any empirical literature on the
above topics based on a literature review, utilizing
MEDLINE search with key words "ethics", "research eth-
ics", "innovation", and "psychopharmacology", supple-
mented by bibliographic cross-referencing. That search
did identify a number of studies which address some of
these questions conceptually, [10-23] but no studies in
which the topic has been examined empirically. It seems
that the world of psychopharmacology research has spent
little time examining the sources of innovation, and there
has been little overlap between researchers and the larger
world of clinicians, where non-research based decisions
are made on a day-to-day basis. Yet, as the example of
Cade highlights, there is a need for more overlap between
clinical work and research, that is, clinical researchers who
are active clinicians engaging in innovative patient care as
well as structured research studies. And yet the funding
structure of research, and the regulatory structure of IRBs
and governmental bodies, discourages such innovative
clinical researchers.
The funding of innovative research
At the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH),
research funding has been divided between "intramural"
and "extramural" types. Extramural research required
extensive oversight into scientific utility. Intramural
research did not require such oversight and was designed
to encourage innovative ideas. In the terminology of Steve
Brodie, an icon of Nobel-prize level psychiatric research,
intramural research allowed investigators to "take a flier"
on new ideas [24]. Unfortunately, now intramural
research at the NIMH requires extramural-like levels of
scientific oversight and justification. As a result, both
inside the NIMH and outside, psychiatric research is more
and more comprised of increasing pristine demonstra-
tions of increasingly trivial points.
The NIMH has also tended to avoid funding of clinical
psychopharmacology research on the grounds that a
source of funds exists in private industry. Yet private
industry targets its research to requirements of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). There are only two pur-
poses for an FDA indication. First, it makes a new medica-
tion available for prescribing physicians. And second, it
gives a pharmaceutical company permission to market
and advertise a medication for that indication. The FDA
only reviews data submitted by pharmaceutical compa-
nies. Companies must have an economic incentive to go
the FDA. Hence, at one level, FDA indications are purely
the result of the economic decisions of pharmaceutical
companies. Today, the tendency of third party payers to
use FDA indications as a way to limit payment for treat-
ments has incentivized drug companies to seek additional
indications for their drugs, but in these cases too the pres-
ence or absence of an indication is primarily driven by
economic, not scientific, motivations. Thus, there is min-
imal correlation between the amount of data supporting
the use of a drug for a specific purpose and whether the
drug is FDA approved for that use.
Also, the pharmaceutical industry does not generally fund
long-term studies of medications, usually because of the
limited length of expected marketing under patent and
due to a lack of need for long-term data in terms of mar-
keting benefit. Once a drug is on the market for an acute
indication, clinicians tend to prescribe those agents for the
very long-term. The prolonged use of antidepressants in
unipolar depression is an example of this phenomenon.
Studies of new agents such as SRIs do not exceed one year
Table 2: Proposed ethical guidelines for clinical innovation in psychopharmacology
1 Use of a treatment based on a viable hypothesis, with a plausible biological, empirical, or theoretical basis
2 Intention to report one's experience for the scrutiny and benefit of the scientific community
3 Willingness to report unexpected observations, perhaps initially noted without an a priori hypothesis.
4 Acceptance of a uniquely high standard of informed consent, not simply for medico-legal purposes, but on ethical groundsPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:26 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/26
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usually, and studies of tricyclic antidepressants have only
been conducted for up to 5 years and even then in less
than a hundred subjects. Yet on these meager grounds, it
is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that millions of
patients are taking these agents for decades or longer. This
would appear to be ethically questionable, but those who
promote more regulations on research are unintentionally
contributing to inhibiting the kinds of studies that we
need to conduct to remedy this situation. Unfortunately,
the NIMH has rarely stepped in to fill this gap either, and
the lack of solid long-term studies of major or minor psy-
chiatric disorders is a serious problem in clinical psychop-
harmacology research.
Further, the Neuropharmacology division of the FDA has
traditionally required rather conservative statistical para-
digms, especially parallel rather than crossover designs,
which do not provide information about the efficacy of
new agents compared to each other. Pharmaceutical com-
panies frequently will not pay for crossover studies, if the
FDA will not allow their results to be included it the mar-
keting of the drug. As the pharmaceutical industry is the
most important source of funds for medical pharmacol-
ogy research, it becomes more and more difficult to do
research beyond the rigid criteria for registration, even
with drugs that are already on the market.
Hence, clinicians do not have data based on FDA-oriented
studies to guide many treatment decisions, and conse-
quently clinicians are almost forced to innovate. Fortu-
nately, the NIMH has recently expanded its use of services-
based funding to obtain extensive clinical outcome data
in psychiatric disorders (such as the Systematic Treatment
Enhancement Program for Bipolar Disorder, STEP-BD).
Further, private sources, such as the Stanley Foundation,
are beginning to step forward to fill the gap with more
flexible designs between the limited kinds and number of
trials supported by the NIMH and the restrictive studies
funded by the pharmaceutical industry.
Issues that merit empirical study
Given that there is an absence of empirical data on which
to draw, we would like to suggest specific questions that
can be assessed with empirical methods.
1. How frequently do clinicians practice outside of FDA
indications in psychiatry? What specific conditions tend
to be treated in that setting? What specific medications are
used?
2. If we accept a definition of ethical innovation along the
lines we suggest, how often do clinicians practice within
those guidelines?
3. How frequently are new treatments in psychopharma-
cology introduced by uncontrolled clinical innovation?
How frequently are they introduced by research trial pro-
tocols before clinical use?
4. How frequently do research protocols derive from or
depend upon prior clinical innovation or serendipitous
observations?
Relationship to formal clinical research
Some in the bioethics community seem to be unaware of
the importance of clinical innovation. And thus, to them,
perhaps, some of the arguments in this paper will not be
convincing. We believe, in contrast, that much of the for-
mal research enterprise depends on clinical innovation.
The argument of this paper is very simple: The only sensi-
ble reading of the historical record in psychopharmacol-
ogy is that there is a factual link between clinical
innovation and progress in the development of new treat-
ments through formal clinical research. Clinical innova-
tion is a legitimate activity, because it often serves a source
of ideas and observations that later leads to classical
research conducted in the formal manner of protocols,
IRB reviews, and rigorous designs. Sometimes clinical
practice can yield important knowledge beyond what can
be gleaned from randomized clinical trial protocols. We
have reviewed some historical examples, such as John
Cade's discovery of lithium. Thus, clinical innovation is a
legitimate and important activity. It seems to us that some
critics of clinical innovation have little or no direct clinical
experience, either in patient care or research, whereas
those with significant experience in both activities tend to
be more aware of the need for clinical innovation.
Does this approach conflict with federal standards, such
as the Belmont Report, which has been identified by the
National Institutes of Health Office of Human Subjects
Research as the philosophical foundation for its ethical
regulations [25]? As mentioned above, the Report leaves
itself open to a strict interpretation when it asserts that
"any element of research" requires formal review. How-
ever, the Report also establishes three fundamental ethical
principles that are relevant to all research involving
human subjects: Respect for Persons, Beneficence, and
Justice. We do not see how the approach to clinical inno-
vation outlined in this paper conflicts with these ethical
principles. In fact, the absence of any ethical guidelines, as
is currently the case, conflicts with these ethical principles.
Thus, it may be that the status quo, which some profes-
sional medical ethicists seem to accept, is not in keeping
with the principles underlying the Belmont Report. We
seek to reinterpret such ethical principles in the setting of
clinical innovation, whereas some in the bioethical com-
munity tend to focus on the formal mechanisms put inPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:26 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/26
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place to promote those principles. Even the NIH notes
that the Report is "not a set of rules that can be applied rig-
idly to make determinations of whether a proposed
research activity is ethically 'right' or 'wrong.' Rather, these
regulations provide a framework in which investigators
and others can ensure that serious efforts have been made
to protect the rights and welfare of research subjects."
In sum, we suggest in this paper that research and clinical
care should be viewed as a continuum, rather than as two
categorically distinct activities. Research is primarily con-
ducted to produce knowledge, and clinical care is primarily
conducted to provide individualized care to a patient; but
research also secondarily provides patient care, and clinical
care secondarily produces knowledge. On that continuum,
some kinds of research can actually provide a great deal of
individual benefit to patients, and some kinds of clinical
care can provide a great deal of new knowledge. We
should give up the either-or dichotomy of the Belmont
Report, which has so polarized our profession into clini-
cians versus researchers, and has produced clinicians who
cannot apply the knowledge produced by our research,
and researchers who do not know what kind of knowl-
edge it is important to provide.
Summary
The basic idea that underpins this paper, and which con-
flicts with those who promote formal regulations as the
sole way to ethically conduct research, is that the best
research is conducted by active clinicians, and that the
best clinical work is conducted by active researchers. The
strict wall separating pure research from pure clinical prac-
tice is at best a fiction, and at worst a dumbing down of
both activities. Clinical innovation is the kind of activity
that bridges this gap. Clinical innovation should be legit-
imized, accepted, and even encouraged within the frame-
work of ethical guidelines, such as those we suggest, so as
to avoid the alternative extremes of indiscriminate prac-
tice on the one hand and over-regulation of all research
on the other.
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